

TO CARE FOR HIM WHO HAS BORNE THE BATTLE AND FOR HIS WIDOW AND ORPHANS.

ESTABLISHED 1877—NEW SERIES.

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CHANCELLORSVILLE.

The Attack of Jackson and the Resistance of the Eleventh Corps.

TRAGEDY OF ERRORS.

Lee's Masterpiece in Audacity and Celerity, but a Mortal Blow to the Army of Northern Virginia.

MOVING TO THE FRONT.

Skillful Manoeuvring of the Rebel General, and an Estimate of His Forces.

BY AUGUSTUS C. HAMLIN, LIEUTENANT-COLONEL AND HISTORIAN OF THE ELEVENTH CORPS, RANGOR, ME.



CHANCELLORSVILLE seems to have been a tragedy of errors, and the terrible losses and sacrifices did not result in decided or satisfactory results to either side. The populous and powerful North could easily replace its loss in artillery, equipment, and in men, but with the South, already enfeebled and overstrained, it was far different. The gain in cannon, in prisoners, and in morale was great, it is true, but it was fearfully paid for by the victorious army.

It may be said with some truth that the campaign was Lee's masterpiece in audacity and celerity, but his victory was like that won in ancient times by Pyrrhus, for it was indeed a mortal blow to the vitality of the Army of Northern Virginia. And it may also be affirmed that when the shot-torn flags of Jackson's Corps were planted in triumph on the crest of Fairview at 9 a. m. Sunday morning, May 2, 1863, the culminating point of its daring and its strength had passed, never to return. The South could not replace the host of dauntless men who went down in the determined and desperate struggle.

Both armies moved to the front with great confidence. The Federal army felt secure and strong in its superior numbers, its splendid equipment, its devotion, and its enthusiasm. The Confederate army, strengthened by the conscription act, and stimulated by the long winter's rest, also felt invincible under the guidance of their trusty leaders. Moreover, the rebels believed that their knowledge of the topography of the country, their skill in bushcraft and marksmanship, gave them a decided advantage over their opponents. Besides all these considerations there was a determined resolution on the part of the Southrons to hurl the invader back.

AT ALL HAZARDS. The crossing of the river does not seem to have been much of a surprise to Lee, as the country had been carefully surveyed in anticipation of this crossing, and in the plans of defense the Wilderness and broken territory had been regarded in the nature of natural fortifications, in which the rebel soldier would have superior advantages over his opponent.

It is doubtful if Lee intended to offer any serious resistance to Hooker's crossing, any more than he did to Grant a year later. The Wilderness, with its almost impenetrable thickets, was a great and natural fortress for the light-armed and light-clad Confederates. And the circumstances of the conflict recall the remarks made at the time of the Revolution of 1775, when it was said in England that "the old system of tactics was out of place, nor could the capacity of the Americans for resistance be determined by any known rule of war; they will long shun an open field, every thicket will be an ambush of partisans, every stone wall a hiding-place for sharpshooters, every swamp a fortress, the boundless woods an impracticable barrier."

And so it proved, for the rebel in his faded uniform was almost invisible in the woods, and his skill as a marksman, his knowledge in bushcraft, certainly compensated largely for a considerable inequality in numbers; and in the thickets of Chancellorsville, and later in the Wilderness, the rebel soldier was certainly superior to his antagonist, man for man, courage reckoned as equal.

Hooker had great celebrity moved the bulk of his army across the Rapidan and the Rappahannock Rivers, and on Friday morning was moving down the Plank and Turnpike roads toward Fredericksburg. About two miles from Chancellorsville his advance was checked, and Hooker then discovered that Lee was entrenched across his path, with a line of earthworks extending from the Rappahannock River southward to the Massaponax stream, and more than three miles in length.

At 11 o'clock Jackson arrived at the front, and stopped all work on the earthworks and prepared to hurl 50,000 men upon the three columns of Hooker's army, then attempting to debouch from the thickets and rugged country in which the

UNION ARMY WAS ENTANGLED. At 2 o'clock, or later, Jackson had turned the right flank of the Twelfth Corps near Aldrich farm, on the Plank road, had turned both flanks of Sykes's Regulars on the turnpike, and menaced the column of the Fifth Corps under Griffin on the River road.

Sykes at this moment found himself confronted by a vastly superior force, with Griffin, of the Fifth Corps, three miles dis-

tant with a broken and almost impassable country between; the Twelfth Corps a mile to his right, southward, and unconnected, and watching Posey's and Wright's Brigades marching along the unfinished railroad to gain the rear of the Union army.

Hooker had no alternative but to fight under great disadvantages or retreat. The broad, open fields Hooker's enemies so strongly allude to were about three miles away, and between them were strong intrenchments, and behind them Jackson with 50,000 men fresh and eager for the fray.

The broad fields which appear on Warren's map and others were mostly covered with forests then, and are to-day. Maj. Michler's map, made with great care three or four years after the battle, indicates that this statement is correct, and to this map the reader is referred to all movements con-



LEE AND JACKSON IN COUNCIL ON THE NIGHT OF MAY 1.

ected with the battle of Chancellorsville. All the maps used in these papers are based on Maj. Michler's surveys.

About 2 Friday afternoon Hooker ordered his advanced forces to return to the selected position near Chancellorsville to intrench and remain on the defensive. From documents extant it is clear that Hooker determined to remain on the defensive and await the effect of the strategic movement of his second army under Sedgwick, and so confident was he of his success that he promised victory to his men, defying even Divine interference.

Had Hooker adhered to this resolve to remain strictly on the defensive, and withstood the brilliant temptations held out to him in the fatal movement in the fancied pursuit of Lee's columns below the Falmouth Furnace to the southward, the results of the campaign undoubtedly would have been different. Certainly the Eleventh Corps would not have been deprived of its strong reserve, nor its officers hypnotized with the fallacious statement that Lee and his entire army was retreating with great haste toward Gordonsville. Certainly the line of defenses would have been kept unbroken, and more than 20,000 men would have been available for the support of the attacked and outflanked and weakened Eleventh Corps.

Late in the evening

JACKSON MET LEE

In the woods near the Plank road, a little over one mile south of the Chancellorsville house, and held a council of war. The Confederate Engineers reported upon the strength of the position to which Hooker had retired, and adversely to any attack upon it from the eastward.

It was then determined to attempt a flank movement and endeavor to reach the right flank and rear of Hooker's army, and get possession of the roads leading to the Ely and U. S. Ford. The movement was entrusted to Jackson, and more than 30,000 men received orders to move at daybreak or sooner in the direction of the Wilderness Tavern.

The early morning light revealed to the lookouts and scouts of the Federal army Jackson's army moving along their front, without any attempt to conceal the columns of infantry with trains of artillery attached. For several hours the procession moved in sight of and within reach of the guns of the Federal army, seemingly in contempt of their foes.

Birney reported the movement to Sickles, and Sickles to Hooker. Finally Birney received permission to try the range of his guns upon the column marching past the Wolford Furnace, about half a mile south of his front, at Hazel Grove. A few shots from Clark's rifled guns dispersed that portion of the enemy's column then in sight, and caused it to seek another route farther to the south, out of reach of the Federal guns, and out of sight of the Federal scouts.

Berdan's Sharpshooters, well supported, then advanced to the Furnace, and afterwards to the unfinished railroad still farther south, where they captured most of the 23d Ga., which was acting as rear-guard to Jackson's flanking troops.

From these captures and these operations sprang the fatal notion that Gen. Lee and his entire army were retreating in dismay. This strange impression was spread rapidly through the army, then halted about Chancellorsville, and was soon magnified into a positive certainty. However, in the Eleventh Corps there were many

MEN WHO HAD FOUGHT JACKSON in two of his flank marches before, and were not so easily deceived, who refused to believe the rumor and were soon assured of its falsity; but they failed to convince the higher officers of the corps of the fact and the impending danger, even at the last moment.

The rebel Army of Northern Virginia at this time was a remarkable and powerful body of men, led by one of the ablest soldiers of the age. It was skilled in the use of arms, hardened in service, animated in a high degree with the enthusiasm of their cause and the desperate courage of self-defense.

them, the privations endured in the defense, is ample evidence of their sincerity. The glorious Army of the Potomac, which fought 60 per cent. of the battles of the war, can afford to grant deserving praise to that determined and resolute body of soldiers who, although deficient in equipment and comforts of military life, and inferior in numbers, yet with a devotion, skill and tenacity worthy of the highest cause, kept them at bay for four long years and struck down on the field of battle 182,000 of its numbers—killed and wounded.

Just and worthy praise to either one reflects its beams upon the other. Both armies will descend to posterity with military records of the highest rank, and history, with its impartial pen, will not discriminate to the credit or discredit of either. This Army of Northern Virginia was com-



posed of the best and the bravest men in the South, and they believed and boasted that they carried with them not only the flag, but the glory and the very life of the Confederacy.

The South considered this army as the bulwark of secession, and sent to it selected bodies of their best men to represent them. Among them were the famous Washington Artillery of New Orleans, the Louisiana Tigers, the renowned riflemen of Mississippi, selected infantry of Alabama, Georgia, and Tennessee, and the hardy descendants of the mountaineers of North and South Carolina who fought with Marion and Morgan in Revolutionary times.

SO CONFIDENT WAS LEE in the strength of his army and his position at this time, that he had sent Longstreet with two of his divisions away down to



DOWDALL'S TAVERN—HOWARD'S HEAD-QUARTERS.

southeastern Virginia, leaving at his disposal but 60,000 men, which he deemed ample to meet any movement made by the Army of the Potomac with double its number of men.

At the time of the battle of Chancellorsville the rebel critics state that Gen. Lee found himself at the head of an army untrained in discipline and all the hardy virtues of the soldier, strengthened by the additions of the Winter and the enforcement of the conscription act, and numbering about 60,000 men, according to the statements of Gen. Taylor and Maj. Hotchkiss, of Lee's and Jackson's staffs, and others.

This estimate does not include the forces which had gone off with Longstreet south of Richmond, and which were not available in the approaching conflict. Gen. Taylor, who was the Adjutant-General of the Army of Northern Virginia, states that Gen. Lee moved toward Chancellorsville with 48,000 men, and keeping Anderson's and McLaws' Divisions with him—less than 14,000 men—he harried Jackson with the rest upon the flank and rear of the Federal army; or 34,000 men.

Later, Taylor qualifies his remarks by saying that Jackson had 26,000 infantry, 6,000 cavalry and 1,600 artillery, or a total of 33,600 men. Probably the numbers exceed this estimate, but we have no positive proof on the subject. Maj. Jed Hotchkiss, of Jackson's staff, has stated that Jackson's Corps increased in three months before the battle from 25,000 to 33,000 muskets; but from this estimate must be taken Early's Division, who remained at Fredericksburg to confront Sedgwick and his forces.

There were 102 guns attached to Jackson's Corps, with 2,900 men, but how many of these were actually in action it is difficult now to ascertain. Besides these, the four batteries of horse artillery of Stuart's must be added, and also the four or more regiments of cavalry which screened the movements of the rebel infantry and effectually picketed all the roads.

A few days after the battle, and after the death of Gen. Jackson, Gen. Lee stated to the War Department at Richmond that each of the two corps had then 30,000 men and were too many men for one man to handle, and asked to have the two corps divided into three.

Jackson started promptly with his men, and moved forward with that

RECKLESS ABANDON that he had previously exhibited in his flank movements in the Shenandoah Valley and in the later campaign which drove Pope and the Federal army back to the shelter of Washington.

At this time he had 28 regiments under A. P. Hill, 22 under Rodes, 20 under Colston, or 70 regiments of infantry in all, and also many guns in the artillery battalions under Col. Crutchfield, Walker, Carter, Jones,

and McIntosh, etc., besides the four batteries of the Horse Artillery under Maj. Beckham.

The columns of this great force filled all the roads and paths leading through the forest toward the west; some of them passed along the front of the Federal army in plain sight of the Third Corps and the Eleventh Corps, a mile or more to the southward.

At this time Jackson's collection of fighters, trudging along the woods and its by-paths, would certainly have presented a curious appearance to a martinet critic of army of the military schools of Europe. The first sight of the commander, in his dingy clothes, with ragged cap perched over his brow, astride old "Sorrel," the tattered flag—worthless as material, but priceless to the hearts of those who carried them; the strange appearance of the men, in ragged and rusty clothes, marching along carelessly and at will, might have suggested Falstaff and his ragamuffins.

A closer and keener look, however, would have soon convinced the said martinet critic that outward appearances do not always indicate the true measure of the soldier; and he might soon have seen that this shabby-looking and apparently undisciplined rabble would, at a signal from their trusty leader, be transformed into a resolute army, more than a match for any equal number of the best troops of the European armies in the singular contest about to ensue. And it may be affirmed that 30,000 of these European troops would have been as helpless before them in the tangled thickets of this Wilderness as Braddock and his British Regulars were before the French and unseasoned Indians in the woods near Fort Duquesne in Colonial times.

This scene might also have recalled the remark of the British officer, Ferguson—second only to Tarleton—made when he noticed the mountaineers

ABOUT TO ATTACK HIM at King's Mountain in the old Revolution, and who soon cleaned him out in spite of his Regulars and superior arms. In this very column could be found many of the descendants of the men whom Ferguson affected to despise as "dirty mongrels"; and they were the sons of Scottish Covenanters, French Huguenots, and English Sea-Rovers—the choicest of fighting material.

About 8 a. m. Birney reported this movement of Jackson's, and a little later it was also seen from the Donald Tavern and from the Talley House, half a mile beyond. At about noon Jackson arrived at a point on the Plank road about two miles south of the Talley farm, when he met Gen. Fitz Lee, who took to the top of the election road about the Burton farm, which gave him a view of the troops of the Eleventh Corps at the Donald clearing, about a mile distant.

The Federal forces were at rest, as were most of the rest of the Federal army along the line at that time. Most of the Eleventh Corps were in eight at the Talley and Donald farms, and part of those at the Hawk farm, about half a mile in the rear, but a part of Devens' Division were concealed in the woods, and the whole of Von Gilsa's Brigade, forming the extreme right, was in the woods half a mile from the Talley House, and could not be seen by Jackson from this position at all, and Von Gilsa was not discovered until the middle of the afternoon, when a party of cavalry and scouts dashed up the turnpike and unmasked their fire and their position.

The story that Von Gilsa's men were seen by Jackson playing cards and carousing is a mistake, as the entire body of men were enveloped by the dense woods and could not be seen either from the Burton Hill or the Lockett farm on the turnpike on the west.

Not only the Eleventh Corps but the whole army was in bivouac at this time, with the exception of Birney, exploring the vicinity of the Wolford Furnace. It was Jackson's intention to

ATTACK THE ELEVENTH CORPS from the Plank road, and that part of the Federal force in position between the Donald and Talley farms, but as he viewed the position from the Burton hill he changed his mind, and ordered the Stonewall Brigade, under Paxton, to remain on the Plank road about one mile and a half from the Wilderness Church, and four regiments of cavalry were to take position at the Burton farm, only one mile and one-eighth from the Donald Tavern, the headquarters of the doomed corps.

The rest of the army was ordered to continue their march to the westward until the Lockett farm was reached, on the old turnpike, two miles west of the Donald Tavern. The day was hot and dusty, but the columns pressed steadily onward, hurried along by their impetuous leader, and at 3 p. m. Jackson, then at the Lockett farm, sent his last dispatch to Lee. This dispatch is now in the State Library at Richmond, and reads:



THE OLD CHANCELLOR HOUSE.

GENERAL: The enemy has made a stand at Chancellorsville. I hope as soon as practicable to attack.

I trust that an ever kind Providence will bless us with great success.

Respectfully, T. J. JACKSON, Lieutenant-General.

Gen. R. E. LEE.

The following is up and the next two appear to be well closed.

Rodes' Division was at once placed in line of battle, and had a long rest of over two hours before called into action. As the rest of his army came up it was placed in position, and at 5 p. m. most of it was ready for action.

According to Jackson's staff officers the attacking force was formed in three lines of battle, with Rodes' Division forming the front line, with Colston's Division as the second line, about 100 paces in rear of the first. The third line was formed by Hill's Division, a part of which was deployed, the other part remaining on the pike ready to be deployed to the right or left, as circumstances might require.

The two front lines presented a front of


two miles in length and extended more than a mile north of the pike and to the rear of the Eleventh Corps, then facing south.

The skirmish-line of Rodes' Division was composed of selected riflemen, and was led by Col. Willis, of the 12th Ga., and so well did he perform his duty that Jackson spoke highly of him in his last moments. Another part of the skirmish-line was commanded by Col. Blackford, and so well were Jackson's orders carried out by these men that although over 10,000 men rested on their arms for two hours or more within a mile of the right flank of the Army of the Potomac, not a man deserted or escaped to give warning of the coming storm.

At 5 p. m. all was ready for the movement which promised to wreck the unsuspecting Federal army. It seems incredible that an army of 30,000 men could be moved directly past the front of a much larger force and arrange itself in three lines of battle within half a mile of the force to be attacked.

"Where was thine eagle, Pallas, that appalled Stern Alaric and Havooc on their way?" Treachery could not have placed the faithful, obedient and patient Army of the Potomac in a more unfortunate and perilous position than that in which it found itself at this moment, when Sickles and a selected force of the Federal army was about to attack Lee's retreating and dismayed men, supplied to beat or near the Wolford House; and Hooker, completely blinded by the brilliant reports coming from the front, sent word to Sedgwick that Lee was in full retreat and Sickles was among his retreating trains.

Most of the attention of the Federal army



STONEWALL JACKSON'S "OLD SORREL" around Chancellorsville was then directed to this movement in front below the Furnace. But Jackson, with his 70 regiments and his artillery and his cavalry, had long ago sailed away past the front, and had completely vanished from the sight and hearing of Sickles' columns, and was then resting quietly in the dense forests in the rear of the Federal army, and four miles in a direct line from the Wolford House, and about to hurl his thunderbolts with almost irresistible force.

As he looked over the forests from the Lockett farm and noted the columns of smoke of the numerous campfires arising in the calm evening air along the extended line of the encamped Federal army, might have said to himself in silent prayer that significant line of the ancients, "Quos Deus vult perdere, prius dementat." (Whom the Gods would destroy, they first make fools.)

Jackson was in the best of feelings when he


ORDERED RODES TO ADVANCE.

He saw that his men, though fatigued, were full of enthusiasm and fight, and also that the way was apparently clear for the destruction of a large part of the Federal army. And so it seemed, but the "best laid schemes of mice and men oft gang a-gley."

Jackson's orders were explicit—to advance steadily without halting, and regardless of all obstacles, to seize the position beyond Talley's farm. The two lines of battle, extending with a front of two miles, were expected to envelop and crush both Devens' and Schurz's Divisions, and it would probably have been done but for the singular conduct of Colquitt, commanding the right brigade of Rodes' Division, at the decisive moment.

A few moments after the advance had commenced Colquitt struck a strong, determined picket reserve and noticed some cavalry on his right front, and conceived the singular idea that Sickles had moved his forces to the right, and was then threatening his flank. Why he should entertain this idea is very strange, as Stuart with his cavalry and the Stonewall Brigade of infantry were both on the Plank road on his right, and guarding it from all attacks from that quarter. Besides this force, the brigades of Archer and Thomas were still in the rear guarding the trains, and Colquitt ought to have known that Sickles could not have reached him without first disposing of these forces.

This suspicion, unfounded as it was, can be credited indirectly to the movement below the Furnace, and it seems to be the only good that can be even distantly accredited to that brilliant expedition, excepting the capture of about 300 prisoners at a fearful cost.



THE OLD CHANCELLOR HOUSE.

The men who made this resistance, which proved of great importance to the Federal army, belonged to the 55th Ohio, but the cavalry Colquitt saw were probably some of Stuart's, who were halted at the Burton farm, for no evidence can be found of any cavalry of our stationed at that point.

At all events, Colquitt was alarmed, and recalled the 6th Ga., which had reached the Talley farm, and changed his brigade to front south; he also compelled Rameau with his brigade to change front and meet the enemy. Rameau did so reluctantly, and marched some distance to the south without finding a solitary Yankee.

On the Plank road, Stuart's cavalry and the Stonewall Brigade of five regiments were compelled to remain quiet until Colquitt had unmasked the line of battle, as he had the right of way; and so for 40 to 60 minutes 17 regiments were kept from performing that important part of the plan which Jackson had entrusted them with.

When Colquitt and the forces which his fatuity had kept back arrived at Donald's, the wrecks of Devens' and Schurz's lines

had escaped or were escaping, and the golden opportunity for complete victory had gone forever.

There is certainly reason to believe that if Colquitt had followed his orders with the same alacrity the rest of his associates did, Devens' Division would have been captured almost to a man; that Schurz's Division would have been rolled up before it could have fairly formed, and that Jackson would have been in the field in the rear of Chancellorsville before Sickles knew of his attack.

And it may be said with some appearance of truth that it was to Colquitt's want of comprehension, or to his stupidity, that

JACKSON'S PLANS FAILED


greatly in their intentions, and that, indirectly, the great soldier lost his life. Rameau complains of Colquitt's action in his reports, but little beyond this can be gleaned of what the Confederate thought of Colquitt. Apparently it was fortunate for Colquitt that Jackson did not live to demand the reasons of his delinquent and stupid subordinate. Colquitt was soon relieved and sent south, where he remained until near the end of the Petersburg campaign.

It has been stated that Jackson did not have any artillery in his column of attack on Saturday afternoon and evening, but, on the contrary, he had both Breathed's and McGregor's batteries of four guns, each following on the pike and keeping pace with the front line of attack, or in advance of it, and these batteries were followed by Moore's battery of four guns, ready to assist if occasion required.

A little distance in rear of these guns might have been seen the artillery battalions of Carter and Crutchfield, with many cannon. Jackson's attacking force was well equipped with cannon, but six only of the many pieces available were called into action, and these were worked so constantly and so rapidly that the gunners became exhausted at times and were replaced by fresh men from the companies in the rear.

These six guns were of Stuart's Horse Artillery, and were those which the gallant boy, Maj. John Pelham, had so often taken into action, and in so fearless a manner as to win for him the highest praises from Stuart, from Jackson, and from Lee. After Fredericksburg, Lee exclaimed to Jackson, "You ought to have a Pelham on each of your flanks." But the Marston of the Southern army was not here. A fatal bullet of the Federal cavalry a few days before, in a fight on the Rappahannock, had cut short his daring career.

His men and his guns, however, were here, and fearfully did they avenge the loss of their beloved and youthful leader. Two of the guns at a time galloped to the front line and poured their shot into the confused masses of the Eleventh Corps, and these in turn were replaced by the sections in the rear, and so a constant fire was kept up until



THE GRAVEYARD AT ANDERSONVILLE.

Donald's was reached, an hour and a half after the action commenced, and here they were complimented by Jackson in person, and relieved from duty by Col. Carter, as the men or horses had not been fed for 48 hours.

(To be continued.)

BAD FOR SALOONS.

Veterans in New York No Longer Go to Them to Cash Checks.

[New York Herald.]

There are nearly 200 saloons in the neighborhood of the Pension Agency at Nos. 393 and 395 Canal street, and for years it has been the custom of the liquor dealers at the quarterly payment time to hang out signs on their swinging doors, and on the windows, "Pensioners, come in," and "Pension checks cashed here." They used to reap a rich harvest, but now they frankly acknowledge that the mission in the basement of the Pension Agency has made a difference of \$20,000 in their business every three months.

Now those old soldiers who, tired, hungry, and thirsty, because of the prey of the saloon runners in the old days, can get plenty to eat and drink, and besides are entertained in the mission while waiting for the agency to open, and in addition they have their checks cashed in the mission without it costing them a penny.

"We started in," said Col. Henry H. Hadley, the Superintendent and Secretary of the Mission, yesterday, "one year ago last night to fight the saloons. Before that time the liquor dealers succeeded in procuring a large portion of the money from the veterans. A commission of from 10 cents to \$1 was charged for cashing the checks, and then a good piece of the money would travel back over the bars. The pensioners generally formed in line at the agency about 12 o'clock midnight prior to the first pay day. Runners from the saloons would accost the men and lure them away by offering them unlimited credit until the checks were secured. In many instances a man who would cash a \$60 check over the bar would receive only \$30."

"In the year that we have been operating we have paid out more than \$1,000,000 in five payments. We furnish coffee and sandwiches for the men, and keep open all night prior to a pay day, entertaining them with singing, etc."

"Funk & Wagnalls, publishers, furnished \$20,000 to start us to-day, and as fast as the checks are cashed we bank them and draw against them."

About 1,500 veterans and widows of veterans formed in line at the agency about midnight on Wednesday. Col. Lovell had the saloons to issue checks at 7 o'clock yesterday morning and kept at it until 4 o'clock in the afternoon. The line extended from Light street to Hudson. As fast as they received their checks the veterans made for the mission below, where the money was dispensed.

"Gimme gold," was the request of a blind veteran, led by his little daughter. He received it, placed it in his pocket and remarked: "I can count it in no pocket without dropping it," and the clink of the 43 \$5 gold pieces and 14 quarter dollars testified to what he said.

The saloons tried to compete with the philanthropists, but had to give up the fight.

His Interest in the Case.

[Detroit Tribune.]

Detective (hurriedly)—Where did that fellow go who just ran out of the hotel?

Citizen (still rubbing the toe that the fugitive stepped on)—I don't know; but I hope he'll go where I told him to.

Why, Certainly.

[Philadelphia Times.]

It's still believed to have been a good idea in Chicago's taking the sign "Push" off the saloon doors Sundays and putting it on the Fair gates.

A YEAR IN SIX REBEL PRISONS.

Terrible Experiences and Sufferings of a New York Cavalryman

in the Hands of the Rebels.

THE CLOSING DAYS.

When Hope Had Gone and Despair Had Settled

Heavily Upon the Prisoners' Hearts.

TERRIBLE MORTALITY.

Final Release, the Trip Back to God's Country, and End of the War.

BY HENRY A. HARMAN, TROOP A, 12TH N. Y. CAV., WATERBURY, N. Y.

IV.

On February, 1865, affairs in prison remained about the same. No new prisoners had arrived in some time, and exchange talk was below par. We had about come to the conclusion that we never would get out, except as we were carted out in the dead-wagon. The death rate continued to increase; from 30 to 50 were taken to the trenches daily.

The rebel recruiting officers came in every day now, and offered all the inducements and some new ones. The rebels said that our Government had deserted us. It certainly looked so, and in reality it had, as